Unraveling Antitrust Leniency: An Analytical Study on Recent Effectiveness Patterns

Abstract

Cartel formation threatens consumer welfare, innovation, and competition. Their clandestine nature makes practices such as price-fixing, market allocation, bid rigging, and exchange of sensitive information difficult to detect unless members betray partners. Leniency programs, offering immunity in return for disclosure, have emerged as key enforcement tools. However, OECD statistics show a decline in applications between 2015 and 2023, raising concerns of overuse, abuse, and reduced deterrent value. Critics caution that excessive leniency weakens sanctions, even for repeat offenders, and may overshadow alternatives such as whistleblower mechanisms. This paper analyzes the downward trend in leniency applications, particularly through 2023, from psycho-economic and legal perspectives. It evaluates effectiveness in cartel detection and explores innovations such as leniency inflation, leniency plus, and private enforcement actions applied globally. Further, it examines non-leniency tools and the compatibility of leniency with settlement frameworks, as reflected in recent proposals to amend India’s competition law. References to Indian jurisdiction are included to illustrate settlement, leniency plus, and confidentiality aspects. Although anchored in the decline observed until 2023, recent OECD data from 2024 suggests a resurgence of leniency in certain jurisdictions, potentially reflecting renewed trust or early impacts of institutional reforms. This study therefore offers a timely, multidimensional assessment of leniency regimes, contributing insights into their evolving effectiveness amid shifting global enforcement patterns.